Three recent laboratoryassociated Brucella incidents resulting in >70 exposures, New **York City, 2015**

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Brucella

- Small, slow-growing Gram negative coccobacilli
- Primary human pathogens: B. melitensis, B. abortus, and B. suis (B. canis rarely causes infection)
- · Readily aerosolized during routine lab work (e.g., opening plates, subculturing)



Brucellosis

- Common zoonotic disease in much of world
 Rare in the US; 2 3 cases annually in NYC.
- Risk factors
 - Consumption of unpasteurized milk or milk products (typically in endemic country)
 - Exposure to infected farm animal or feral pig
 - Lab work with unrecognized Brucella isolate on open bench
- Infectious dose extremely low
- Incubation period typically 2 4 weeks (can be as long as 5 months)
- Symptoms: intermittent or undulant fever; sweats; fatigue;
- If not treated early, can persist as chronic, debilitating illness



Hospital and Lab A Initial Evaluation

- 4/15/15
 - Patient presents to NYC hospital, traveling directly from JFK Airport, with >1 week of severe neck pain
 - In Mauritania 6 9 months
 - EMR notes: denies fever, chills or night sweats
 - In ED, temperature increases to 101.9° F
 - Two days later, ID physician elicits history of 4 months of recurrent fever, $8-10\,$ lb. weight loss and anorexia
- Differential dx includes HIV, leptospirosis, mosquito- and tick-related infections, but not brucellosis



Hospital and Lab A

Illness Course


- After >70 hours of incubation, 2 blood culture sets flagged for growth
 - Bottles vented and Gram stained in biological safety cabinet (BSC)
 - Gram stain: small Gram negative coccobacilli
 - Work with isolate performed on open laboratory bench for one week
 - NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) contacted after outside laboratory identifies presumptive Brucella sp.
 - Re-interviewed, patient reports consumption of raw cow, goat and camel milk when in Africa



Assessment of Exposure Risk After Laboratory *Brucella* Incident

- High-risk exposure
 - Direct personal exposure to isolate (e.g., sniffing; skin contact; pipetting by mouth; spraying into eyes, etc.)
 - Working with isolate on open bench
 - Being within 5 feet of laboratorian working with isolate on open bench
 - Being in laboratory at any time when procedure conducted on open bench that can aerosolize brucellae (e.g., venting blood culture bottles, catalase testing, or vortexing)
- Low-risk exposure
 - Being present in laboratory when others working with isolate, though not meeting high-risk definition






	2008 Recommendations		2012 Recommendations
Antimicrobial PEP	High Risk	Doxycycline + rifampin x 3 weeks or TMP-SMX + rifampin x 3 weeks*	No changes
rtr	Low Risk	Discuss PEP, make available	
Serologic Monitoring		Baseline, 2, 4, 6, 24 weeks post-exposure (after last known exposure)	Baseline, 6, 12, 18, 24 weeks post-exposure (after last known exposure)
Symptom Surveillance		Regular (e.g., weekly) symptom watch for febrile illness through 24 weeks post-exposure (after last known exposure)	Regular (e.g., weekly) symptom watch and daily self fever- checks for febrile illness through 24 weeks post-exposure (after last known exposure)

Incident Management Challenges

- Discerning risk is not clear-cut
 - Recalling when particular lab work took place and who may have been exposed
 - Assessing risk in persons who briefly traverse lab
 - Determining the shared air space
- Long-term commitment needed by hospital employee health to manage follow-up logistics
- Some at-risk employees (e.g., pregnant or immune suppressed) will refuse prophylaxis and serological surveillance





<u>Lab B</u> <u>Lab C</u> Lab D Date DOHMH notified 4/15/2015 5/14/2015 7/20/2015 8/28/2015 Travel history elicited? Risk factors? Yes Yes Yes Summary of Recent NYC Laboratory Hrs BCxs incubated before flagged BCxs vented on open bench? BCxs Gram stained on open ber Incidents Small GN occobacilli Small GP Small GN occobacilli Small GN Subcultured on open bench? Catalase test on open bench? Used MALDI-TOF MS? Yes Yes No No Days isolate worked on open bench Number prophylaxed (% of high risk) Number of infections as of 9/22/2015 20 (80) 12 (80) 9 (82)

Biosafety Steps to Prevent Exposure to *Brucella* spp.

- · Vent all blood culture bottles in Class II or higher BSC
- Use BSC when working with unknowns, and especially slow-growing Gram negative organisms
- Review ASM protocols for ruling out and referring potential biological threat agents (BTA), including Brucella spp.
- Contact the Health Department when Brucella spp. cannot be ruled out
- Do not attempt identification of isolate with instruments or automated systems in lieu of referring a possible Brucella isolate to Public Health Laboratory





